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The Preclusion Sanction-A Violation of the
Constitutional Right to Present a Defense
In the recent case of Williams v. Florida,' the Supreme Court
apparently laid to rest 2 the strongest possible challenge to the con-
stitutionality of pretrial discovery by the prosecution, in finding that
such discovery did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.3 This decision would seem to con-
firm the validity of state pretrial notice statutes-requiring, for ex-
ample, notice of an intention to raise the defense of alibi,1 insanity,5
or self-defense-and expanded prosecutorial discovery under proposed
rules 12.1, 7 12.28 and 16(b)" of the federal rules of criminal procedure.
However, the amicus brief submitted in Williams also challenged the
constitutionality of the sanctions authorized by these statutes to en-
1. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). This case upheld the validity of a Florida notice of alibi statute,
against the contention that, in requiring pretrial disclosure by the defendant, the statute
violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self.incrimination. In flding
no such infringement the Court held that the pretrial disclosure was "not compelled
self-incrimination transgressing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 85.
2. But see Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 IIARv. L. RLV.
994, 1007-09 (1972), in which the holding of Williams is criticized and the opposite
position is expounded, i.e., that forced pretrial disclosure by the defendant does violate
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
3. 399 U.S. at 86.
4. Sixteen states have notice of alibi statutes. See, e.g., FLA. R. CraM. P. 1.200 (1967);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3218 (Snpp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, . 585 (1969).
5. Fourteen states have some notice of insanity or special plead Ing statute. See, e.g.,
ARIZONA R. CRIM. P. 192(A) (1956); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (Supp. 1971); MiCei. COwtw.
LAws ANN. §§ 768.20, 768.21 (1968).
6. See, e.g., MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 95-1803(d) (1967).
7. Proposed Rule 12.1, in relevant part, is a notice of alibi procedure under which
pretrial notice of alibi witnesses must be submitted by the defendant. If notice is not
given, the defendant may, in the discretion of the court, be precluded front offering
those witnesses at trial. However, no limitation is placed on the right of the defendant
to testify in his own behalf. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts, 52 F.R.D. 409, 432.33
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rule 12].
8. Proposed Rule 12.2 is a notice of insanity procedure in which the defendant must
serve notice of his intention to rely on the defense of insanity or his intention to call
expert witnesses concerning the issue of requisite mental state, prior to trial. In contrast
to rule 12.1, this rule is silent as to use of the preclusion sanction. Id. at 435.36.
9. Proposed Rule 16(b) would require that, upon motion of the government, the
defendant disclose all documents and tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests,
and the names of all witnesses that the defendant intends to use at trial. In tile event
that the defendant fails to disclose such information, the court pursuant to 16(d)(3)
may, in its discretion, preclude the defendant from offering that evidence at trial. Pre-
liminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
for the United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 553, 591, 593-94 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Proposed Rule 16]. The proposed rule permits much broader prosecutorial discovery
than the existing rule, 16(c): first, by not making the government's discovery conditional
on a prior motion for discovery by the defendant; and second, by broadening the scope
of mandatory discovery to include reports of examinations and tests and a list of pro.
posed witnesses. Compare FED. R. CaRsI. P. 16(c).
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force the discovery orders.10 Most of the statutes, including the Florida
statute" involved in Williams and both the current 2 and proposed 3
federal rules on discovery, provide that in the event notice is not given
or evidence disclosed, the judge, in his discretion, may preclude the
defendant from offering that evidence at trial.14 Moreover, such pre-
clusion is permissible irrespective of the materiality of the proffered
evidence'3 or the manner of its presentation (e.g., through testimony
by the defendant,' 6 testimony by other witnesses,' 7 or through tangi-
ble' s or documentary 9 evidence). While the Court in Williams found
it unnecessary to assess the constitutionality of this sanction,20 since
the defendant had complied with the statute initially, use of preclusion
in this context raises serious constitutional questions.2' This Note
will examine the degree to which the preclusion sanction infringes
upon the constitutional rights of the accused and evaluate the possible
justifications for this infringement in light of the state interest in
pretrial discovery.
I. The Right to Present a Defense
A. Preclusion-An Evidentiaty Basis
In order to assess the constitutionality of the preclusion sanction, it
is first necessary to indicate the principal theories which have been
offered to justify imposition of the sanction. The first of these might
10. Brief for Virgil Jenkins as Amicus Curiae at 17-26, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970).
11. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.200 (1967).
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(g).
13. See Proposed Rule 12, supra note 7, at 432; Proposed Rule 16, supra note 9,
at 593-94.
14. There are two exceptions to the general rule stated in the text. InI Kansas, the
notice of alibi statute provides for mandatory preclusion while in Oklahoma, only a
continuance can be granted to the prosecution if the defense fails to give the required
notice. KA-,. STAT. ANN. § 22-3218(4) (Supp. 1971); OKrLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 58. (1969).
15. State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 4, 176 N.E. 656. 657 (1931).
16. See State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis.2d 129, 133-34. 163 N.W.2d 177, 178-79
(1968) interpreting the Wisconsin notice of alibi statute, Wise. STAT. ANN. § 955.07 (1967),
reinacted as Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 971.23 (1969), to authorize the preclusion of the de-
fendant from testifying about an alibi where he failed to give notice. But see, KA%.
STAT. Ax. § 29-3218(4) (Supp. 1971), in which testimony by the defendant is spcifically
excepted from the operation of the preclusion sanction.
17. E.g., Proposed Rule 12, supra note 7, at 432.
18. E.g., FED. R. CRiMt. P. 16(c) & 1 6(g).
19. Id.
20. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83, n.14 (1970). See also Radford v. Stewart, 320
F. Supp. 826, 830 (D. Mont. 1970), in which the question of the constitutionality of
preclusion was noted but, again, because the sanction ias not actually applied, the
question was left unanswered.
21. See Proposed Rule 12 (Advisory Committee Notes), supra note 7, at 434-35.
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be termed the punitive justification and is based on the belief that
preclusion is the only effective means by which the state can enforce
its pretrial discovery statutes.2 2 The validity of this justification in
light of the possible constitutional infirmities of the sanction, will be
considered in Part II of this Note. - The second rationale might be
termed the evidentiary basis for preclusion. It is based on a belief
that preclusion, as it is traditionally practiced, is used only to render
incompetent24 evidence inadmissible, a procedure which has never
been thought to infringe upon the rights of a defendant at trial.
This latter theory finds support, at least in civil cases,2  in the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Hammond Packing Co. v. Ar-
kansas.26 In that case, the Court was called upon to determine the
constitutionality of an Arkansas civil pretrial discovery statute under
which the preclusion sanction had been imposed upon the defendant
for his wilful refusal to comply with an order requiring production
of witnesses, books and documents. In rejecting the contention that
the sanction violated due process, the Court said:
This case presents a failure by the defendant to produce what
we must assume was material evidence in its possession and a
resulting striking out of an answer and a default. The proceeding
here taken may therefore find its sanction in the undoubted right
of the lawmaking power to create a presumption of fact as to the
bad faith and untruth of an answer begotten from the suppression
22. Id. at 435; Kaufman, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 488 (1967).
23. See pp. 1353-61 infra.
24. Though the text analyzes the primary evidentiary basis for the sanction, a slightly
different rationale is offered by courts in states in which the notice of insanity pro-
cedure, for instance, is incorporated into the pleading requirements. E.g., CAL. PF'NAL
CODE § 1016 (West 1972); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.76.020 (1961). In those states, failure
to plead the insanity defense is viewed as precluding the future offer of that defense
at trial. Consequently, when the defendant attempts, at trial, to offer evidence con.
cerning insanity, the court will rule that such evidence is immaterial rather than In.
competent, on the premise that the defense of insanity is not at issue. State v. Bonner,
53 Wash.2d 575, 587, 335 P.2d 462, 469 (1959); State v. McLain, 199 Wash. 66-1, 665,
92 P.2d 875, 877 (1939). Yet, this approach does not remedy the constitutional defect
of preventing the defendant from presenting a defense which, if established despite the
procedural omission, would render him free of criminal liability under the substantive
law of the jurisdiction. See discussion in text under the Sixth Amendment Right to
Compulsory Process, pp. 1345-51 infra.
However, it should be noted that the above analysis would not apply to a split trial
procedure, such as that in California. As the California Supreme Court observed it
People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330, 355, 202 P.2d 53, 68 (1949), in response to a due process
attack on the split trial procedure, the split trial only alters the timing of the presetn.
tation of evidence concerning the insanity defense, it does not preclude that defense
from being offered.
25. The Supreme Court has never adjudicated the constitutionality of the preclusion
sanction in a criminal case.
26. 212 U.S. 322 (1909). Despite its age, this case is still regarded as support for the
preclusion sanction embodied in Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Advisory Committee and Historical Notes, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 37 (1968).
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or failure to produce the proof offered, when such proof concerned
the rightful decision of the cause .... In this the preservation of
due process was secured by the presumption that the refusal to
produce evidence material to the administration of due process
was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense.2 -
Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a recent criminal case,
sustained the preclusion of a defendant from testifying in his own
behalf because of a failure to comply with an alibi notice statute, on
the grounds that:
What is constitutionally protected is the right of a defendant to
testify truthfully in his own behalf . ... These decisions [prior
holdings by the Wisconsin Supreme Court upholding the pre-
clusion sanction] and the statute on which they are based, do
not limit in any way the right of a defendant to testify truth-
fully in his own behalf. The condition of prior notice as to alibi
testimony, like the test as to materiality and relevancy, does not
invade the right of a defendant to testify in his own defense.28
In short, both of these courts seem to find no conflict between due
process and the preclusion of otherwise relevant and material evidence
on the theory that the failure to comply with pretrial discovery makes
such evidence presumptively unworthy of belief and the resulting
incompetency of the evidence justifies its inadmissibility. However,
in the case of Washington v. Texasi2D the Supreme Court shattered
the constitutional underpinning of this theory when it expressly held
that the establishment of such a priori categories of incompetency,
based on presumed untrustworthiness, violates the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to compulsory process-his right to present a de-
fense.30
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Compulsory Process3'
1. The Washington Case
In 1964 a group of youths, including Jackie Washington and Charles
Fuller, drove to the home of Washington's ex-girlfriend and began
27. 212 U.S. at 350-51 (emphasis added).
28. State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis.2d 129, 137-38, 163 Nl.W.2d 177, 181 (1963)
(emphasis added).
29. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
30. Id. at 22.
31. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... "S. CONsT., amend. VI.
1345
The Yale Law Journal
hurling bricks at the house. After the rest of the group returned to
the car, Washington and Fuller were left alone outside the house
with a loaded shotgun that Fuller had brought. When the girl's new
boyfriend emerged to investigate the disturbance, either Washington
or Fuller fired the shotgun and killed him. On trial for murder in
a state court in Texas, Washington desired to have Fuller testify to
the effect that Washington had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Fuller
not to shoot and, in fact, had run back to the car before Fuller had
shot the boy. As Fuller had been convicted of murder in a prior trial,
it was undisputed that he would have testified and that his "testimony
would have been relevant and material, and that it was vital to the
defense."32 In spite of this, the trial court, on motion of the State,
refused to allow Fuller to testify because of a Texas statute which
prohibited co-principals from testifying in each other's behalf. Eight
members33 of the Supreme Court agreed in holding that:
the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State
-arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who
.was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that
he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have
been relevant and material to the defense.
3 4
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first established that the
right to present a defense, traditionally held to be a fundamental
element of due process of law,35 was in fact the embodiment of the
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain teIms the right to present a
defense, the right to present the defe fdant's version of the facts
as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the
truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prose-
cution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony,
he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.
This right is a fundamental element of due process of lawA6
32. 388 U.S. at 16.
33. The ninth, Justice Harlan, concurred in the holding on the grounds that, since
the Texas statute in question was irrational, it violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, he disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause to include the right to present as
well as obtain witnesses. In addition, he repeated his criticism of the selective incor.
poration doctrine, which, in this case, the majority had applied to Sixth Amendment
Compulsory Process in order to make it binding upon the states. 388 U.S. at 23.25
(Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 23.
35. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967); in re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1918).
36. 388 U.S. at 19.
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In thus going beyond a literal reading of the Sixth Amendment,
which speaks only of "obtaining" witnesses, the Court considered
the historical purpose of that portion of the Amendment-to over-
come the common law disqualification of all defense witnesses37
-and concluded that the right to obtain witnesses must naturally
import the right to examine them.38 In short, the Court found that
"[t]he Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile
act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of
witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use."30
Having established that a defendant has a right to examine all wit-
nesses, the Court then sought to give that right some meaning against
common law or statutory disqualification. At the outset, it is clear
from the holding that the Court was not contesting the validity of
the broad evidentiary requirements which, to be sure, limit the ad-
missibility of testimony: specifically, that testimony must be relevant
and material,40 be the result of personal observation, 41 and be given
by a witness who is physically and mentally capable of perceiving and
relating events to the court.42 However, the statute in Washington
37. 2 J. STORY, CONSTITUTION OF TIlE UNrrED STATES § 1792 (4th ed. 1873).
38. Accord United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 32 (No. 14, 692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807);
State ex reL. Brown v. Dewell, 167 So. 687, 690 (Fla. 1936).
39. 388 U.S. at 23.
40. Hardin v. State, 471 SAV.2d 60, 62 (Tex. App. 1971); State v. Groppi, 41 Wis.2d
312, 323, 164 N.W.2d 266, 271 (Wis. 1969), reu'd on other grounds, 400 U.S. 503 (1971).
Thus, there may be no violation of equal protection where indigents are required to
make a showing of materiality under FED. R. CPJt. P. 17(b), in order to obtain witnesses
at government expense. Hoskins v. Wainwright, 440 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1971); Slawck
v. United States, 413 F.2d 957, 959-60 (8th Cir. 1969). However, see United States v.
Seeger, 180 F. Supp. 476, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) in which it was held that the %ery re-
quirement of a prior showing of materiality, where no question of government expendi-
ture is involved, violates the right to compulsory process.
41. This comports with the traditional evidentiary rule that hearsay testimon) is
inadmissible. See 5 J. WNIGIOr.E, EVmECE § 1361, 1362 (3d ed. 1910). Nevertheless, it
should be noted that the hearsay exclusion may deprive a defendant of relevant cvi-
dence, on the grounds that such evidence is presumptively unworthy of belief. Id. § 1362.
In fact, it has been suggested that this result may be constitutionally suspect, as a viola-
tion of due process. Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D.
375, 380-86 (1968). However, there are important differences between the use of an
irrebuttable presumption of untrustworthiness in the hearsay context, and similar use
in the context of testimonial incompetence, based on the likelihood of perjury. In the
latter instance, it has been argued that the effectiveness of both cross-examination and
perjury sanctions, in reducing the probability of false testimony, renders the broad
sweep of preclusion unnecessary. See note 53 infra. On the other hand, neither of these
safeguards, cross-examination or the perjury sanction, can be applied to mitigate the
possibility of false testimony by an extra-judicial declarant. 5 J. Wimc.ouE, EvIrDEcE §
1361 (3d ed. 1940). Consequently, while an exclusionary rule, as applied to hearsay,
may be sustainable as the only means of preventing this source of false testimony, a
similar argument cannot be made to justify the exclusion of in-court testimony as in.
competent because of the likelihood of its falsification. Compare note 60 infra.
42. However, even as to these more readily discernible grounds of incompetency, a
broad, a priori rule of exclusion has been criticized. See 2 J. WoIG.%o, EvID.cCE §§ 492,
500, 501 (3d ed. 1940). Consequently, as a general matter, courts will disqualify proposed
witnesses only after an individual examination confirms their disability.
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involved another aspect of witness capacity: veracity. This was the
category of incompetency-including disqualification based on inter-
est,43 moral capacity44 or other factors which might affect the truth-
fulness of the testimony-that the Court found to be in conflict with
the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. In the words of
the Court,
It is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less violated fin
comparison with the exclusion of all defense testimony] by arbi-
trary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from
testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them
unworthy of belief.45
In support of this position, the Court stressed the aforementioned
purpose of the compulsory process clause-to overcome the common
law disqualification of all defense witnesses-and the consistent ju-
dicial and legislative trend toward elimination of the various disquali-
fications based on presumptive untrustworthiness.4 Specifically, the
Court stated that its reasoning in Rosen v. United States,47 in which
the Court had struck down a common law rule of disqualification
based on moral incapacity, was required by the Sixth Amendment. 18
Consequently, although the statute in Washington was based on a
form of interest incompetency, 49 it seems evident that the holding
cannot be limited to the particular source of presumptive untrust-
worthiness considered in that case.
Although a broad reading of the Sixth Amendment to include a
constitutional definition of competency has been criticized,50 such an
43. Id. § 575.
44. Id. § 515.
45. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).
46. The Court cited Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918) (id. at 22) and
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (id. at 20) in which both of these trends are
discussed.
47. 245 U.S. 467 (1918). In Rosen, the issue of a witness' competency to testify, despite
a prior crime conviction, was before the Court. Whereas prior cases had held that the
state law at the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was controlling, United States v.
Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851), and pursuant to that law, the witness in question
was properly ruled incompetent, the Court found "that the dead hand of the common.
law rule of 1789 should no longer be applied .... " Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S.
467, 471 (1918). In so holding, the Court took note of the judicial and legislative trend
toward removing such restrictions, id., and the policy consideration that:
the truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of
competent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved
in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the
jury or by the court, rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent ....
Id.
48. 388 US. at 22.
49. Id. at 20, 21.
50. See Note, Right of Defendant to Have Testimony of Co.Participant, 20 BAYLOIt
L. REv. 467, 472 (1968); Note, The Sixth Amendment Guarantee of Compulsory Process
is Violated, 46 TEXAs L. REV. 795, 797 (1968).
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interpretation seems consistent with the basic purpose of the right
to compulsory process. Simply stated, that purpose is to assure a
vigorous adversary proceeding by affording the defendant the means
of presenting witnesses in his favor to at least the same degree that
the government can use witnesses against him.'; The fundamental
goal of the trial process-the search for trutha2-thereby will be served.
Moreover, considering that goal, the leading commentators" agree
that the risk of false testimony does not justify the cost of keeping
otherwise relevant evidence from the jury, given the difficulty of
determining a priori whether an individual is likely to speak the
truth, the opportunity to attack witness credibility on cross-examina-
tion, and the availability of sanctions against perjury. As Professor
Morgan succinctly put it, "[N]o rational procedure will sanction an
exclusionary rule supported only by its supposed efficacy to hinder
or prevent false testimony." 54
Finally, although the Court in W1ashinglon found the Texas statute
irrational because it did not even set apart a group of persons par-
ticularly likely to commit perjury5; such a finding of irrationality
was probably not essential to the outcome of the case. The question
before the Court was whether a legislature had the power to establish
a presumption of untrustworthiness, the effect of which was to render
inadmissible otherwise relevant and material evidence. An adequate
evaluation of the rationality of such a presumption requires more
than the establishment of a rational connection between the proven
fact 50 and the presumed fact.57 In addition, the burden of proof re-
quired of the defendant to overcome this presumption must also be
assessed. 8 The greater this burden the less likely it will be that de-
fendants offering truthful testimony will be able to overcome the
presumption, and therefore the stronger the likelihood of perjury
must be.59 In the case of irrebuttable presumptions like the one in
Washington, the burden can never be met. Therefore, whenever the
Court is faced with an irrebuttable presumption of untrustworthiness,
51. In re Dillon, 7 Fed. Cas. 710, 712 (No. 3914) (N.D. Calif. 1854).
52. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
53. See, e.g., 2 J. WIGMORE, EvIDE-cE §§ 515, 576 (3d ed. 1910). See also C. McCoastii,
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 71 (1954).
54. Morgan, Foreword to ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE, at 6 (1942).
55. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).
56. In Washington, for instance, the "proven fact" would be that the proposed witness,
Fuller, was a co-principal of the defendant.
57. The "presumed fact" would, of course, be that the proposed witness will be
untrustworthy-will not testify truthfully.
58. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal
Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 184-85 (1969).
59. Id. at 186.
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it should require not merely a rational connection but virtually a
perfect correlation between the class of evidence designated and the
assumption that such evidence would be false or misleading.A0
The presumption of untrustworthiness upon which the preclusion
sanction rests certainly does not reflect a strong enough correlation to
satisfy the test described above. An assessment of the connection be-
tween the defendant's failure to disclose evidence and the truth or
falsity of that evidence should focus on those factors which would
lead the defendant to refuse to disclose truthful evidence. As an alibi
defense may be the most easily fabricated, 61 the rationality of pre-
clusion as incorporated in the notice of alibi statutes should be ex-
amined closely.
There are three considerations which might motivate a defendant
to withhold disclosure of true alibi witnesses. First, the defendant
might seek the advantages of surprise which silence affords. Second,
the defendant might fear intimidation or manipulation of his wit-
nesses by the government, either through threats of prosecution or
by offers of immunity or attractive bargains. Third, the defendant
might wish to protect either the privacy of his witnesses or his rela-
tionship with them from the intensive government investigation which
would probably follow disclosure.0 2 Moreover, there is also the inde-
pendent likelihood that the undisclosed witnesses will agree to commit
perjury. The reasoning of Washington that inferences of perjury,
based on a witness' interest or moral incapacity have insufficient
rationality to support an irrebuttable presumption of untrustworthi-
ness, surely destroys any argument that a witness' degree of friendship
with the defendant will yet support that presumption. Consequently,
60. It may be argued that a presumption which fails to attain the proper degree of
correlation-like a presumption for which there is no rational connectlon-is unconsti-
tutional per se. But it would probably be more reasonable to allow the government to
argue that the presumption under attack is sufficiently important to the effectuation of
its valid interests as to overcome this requirement of a high degree of correlation. 'e
discussion of the hearsay rule in note 41 supra. Such an argument would probably lead
to a balancing procedure similar to the one described in Part II, pp. 1353.54 infra it
which, assuming the state's interest in preventing false testimony to be compelling, the
marginal increase in effectiveness of preclusion in satisfying that interest must be
weighed against the danger that true testimony may be precluded, Yet, upon reexam-
ining the Court's reasoning in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918) (see note 47
supra), reaffirmed by the Court in Washington, 388 U.S. at 22, it seems clear that,
consistent with the position of the leading commentators (see p. 1349 supra), this bal-
ance has already been resolved against preclusion.
61. See Note, supra note 2, at 1010.
62. Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-fin Search of a Standard, 1961 DuKE L.J.
477, 498 (1964). While the discussion in the text focuses on the notice of alibi statutes,
it should be added that where notice of insanity is at issue, the defendant may also
desire to avoid the opprobrium and possible civil commitment which might accompany
such revelation.
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although there may be a rational connection between intentional 3
nondisclosure and falsity, the correlation hardly approaches a degree
of predictability sufficient to justify the imposition of an irrebuttable
presumption that prevents a defendant from introducing material
evidence in his defense. In short, preclusion is merely another a priori
classification of presumptive untrustvorthiness which would seem to
violate the defendant's right to present a defense.0 4
2. Scope of that Right
The Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, the core of
the right to present a defense, clearly establishes the defendant's right
to present testimony in his own behalf. However, as preclusion may
also apply to documentary and tangible evidence,03 the extent to
which the right to present a defense covers these sources of evidence
must be determined as well.
Both courts66 and commentators 7 have supported the proposition
that the right to compulsory process must not be so narrowly con-
63. Where, however, the defendant's failure to disclose is unintentional-that is, in
a case in which there is no wilful refusal to disclose known infortation-it is doubtfl
that there would be any rational connection between such nondisclosure and the truth
or falsity of that evidence. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
This may explain why all pretrial discovery statutes, except for that of Kansas, provide
the judge with discretion to deny preclusion for good cause shown. See note 14 sitpra.
64. A similar conclusion of constitutional infirmity was reached by three members
of the Supreme Court in a dissenting opinion to a denial of certiorari in the case of
Braswell v. Florida, 400 U.S. 873 (1970). Braswell involved a trial court's preclusion of
a defendant's sole corroborating witness on the grounds that the witness had remained
in the courtroom despite the prior announcement of a sequestration order. In his dissent,
Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, said,
I would grant certiorari in this case to hold that Florida cannot enforce a mere
procedural rule by denying a criminal defendant his constitutional right to present
witness on his own behalf .... While the "Witness Rule" has a valid purpose and
can contribute to the search for truth, a breach of the rule cannot be used to deny
a criminal defendant his constitutional right to obtain and present witnesses in his
favor. U.S. Const., Amdt. VI; cf. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 1. (1967).
Id. Nevertheless, it should be noted that both the defendant and his counsel in Braswell
were found to be innocent of any knowledge of their witness' violation. Since the general
rule in federal courts has been that preclusion is improper where the defendant and
counsel are unaware of the violation, United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 62., 631 (7th
Cir. 1962), it may be that the dissent in Braswell represents no real departure front
precedent, except in its application of the federal rule to state courts. Moreover, since
most discovery statutes provide that preclusion can be avoided for good cause shown,
see note 14 supra, the position of the dissenters in Braswell does not answer the more
important question of whether preclusion is constitutional when the defendant inlen.
tionally refuses to comply with pretrial discovery.
65. See, e.g., FED. R. C.mR. P. 16(c), 16(g); Proposed Rule 16, supra note 9, at 591,
593-94.
66. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring);
United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 735 (S.D. Calif. 1952).
67. 8 J. Wicg.oRE, EvInENCE §§ 2191, 2193, 2200 (3d ed. 1940); 3 F. W%'iImlTON, CUIMINAL
EVIDENCE §§ 1105, 1106 (11th ed. 1935). See also Note, A Defendaut's Right to Inspect
Pretrial Congressional Testimony of Government Witnesses, 80 YALu L.J. 1388, 1393-99
(1971).
1351
The Yale Law Journal
strued as to be limited to testimonial evidence alone. In United States
v. Burr,68 Chief Justice Marshall, while riding circuit, was called
upon to interpret the scope of the compulsory process clause in de-
termining the propriety of a subpoena duces tecum sought by Burr
to compel disclosure of letters in the hands of President Jefferson.
In the course of holding that the subpoena should issue, Marshall said,
This court would certainly be very unwilling to say that upon
fair construction the constitutional and legal right to obtain its
process, to compel the attendance of witnesses, does not extend
to their bringing with them such papers as may be material in
the defense. The literal distinction which exists between the
cases is too much attenuated to be countenanced in the tribunals
of a just and humane riation.09
Although there have been suggestions that such documentary evi-
dence is itself more "testimonial" in nature than tangible evidencee 0
that distinction seems equally "attenuated."71 In this respect, the
strong dictum of the Court in Washington bears repeating:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts
as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where
the truth lies.7 2
Moreover, to argue that "the defendant's version of the facts" may
not include tangible evidence under certain circumstances is to ignore
the realities of the trial process. In a case where items of physical evi-
dence, such as bloodstains, fingerprints, or the alleged murder weapon
are critical to the determination of guilt or innocence, they are as
much a part of the defendant's version of the facts as witnesses are
68. 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14, 692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
69. Id. at 35.
70. See Note, supra note 67, at 1399.
71. Similarly, in a second area in which there has been reliance on the right to
present a defense-namely, mandatory, prosecutorial disclosure pursuant to the Court's
holding in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)-no such distinction between doct.
mentary and tangible evidence has been made. See Proposed Rule 16 (Advisory Coit.
mittee Notes), supra note 9, at 602; Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal
Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 147 (1964). In urging that Brady must be
read as recognizing the defendant's right to present a defense, commentators have cited
due process and not compulsory process as the source of that right (Note, sulna at
142-45). It is clear, however, that the Court in Washington found the two synonymous
in affording the defendant the right to present all material evidence In his behalf, 388
U.S. at 19.
72. 388 U.S. at 19.
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in other cases. Therefore, the relevance and materiality of the prof-
fered evidence, rather than its form, must govern tie applicability
of the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.
II. Justification Despite Infringement
Constitutional rights are not absolute. Regrdless of which doctrinal
analysis is applied--compelling state interest, conditional privilege or
waiver-courts have recognized that there can be justification for the
resultin limitation of a constitutional right. Consequently, in assess-
ing the constitutionality of the preclusion sanction, a finding of in-
fringement of the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense is not
enough. A further investigation into possible justifications must be
conducted.
A. Compelling State Interest Test
Occasionally, courts have found justification for incidental infringe-
ment of even the most fundamental constitutional rights where that
infringement was essential to the implementation of a compelling
state interest. 73 Pursuant to this theory, a determination of the con-
stitutionality of an infringement of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights rests on the following two-step analysis. First, the Court must
assess the urgency of the state interest, for if that interest cannot be
deemed compelling, constitutional infringement is impermissibleT
4
Second, even where that interest is found to be compelling, the Court
must determine whether alternative means, less restrictive of constitu-
tional rights, exist to effectuate that interest.75 Moreover, while these
alternatives must "adequately"7 6 safeguard the asserted state interest,
it has never been held specifically that they must be equally protective
of that interest. What must in fact be balanced is "the state's interest in
the added effectiveness of the chosen means against the individual
73. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1969).
74. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960). But see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 463-64 (1971) (Black. J., dissenting), in
which the very concept of balancing, of searching for even a compelling state interest,
is eschewed. In Justice Black's view, fundamental constitutional rights should simply
not be subject to balancing.
75. See generally Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Altenatke,
9 UTAH L. REV. 954 (1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE
LJ. 464 (1969).
76. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
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interest in the use of less drastic ones." 7 Consequently, given its con-
stitutional infirmities, the preclusion sanction can only be justified if
the state interest served by that sanction is compelling and there exist
no reasonably effective alternatives for promoting that interest which
have a less drastic impact upon the rights of the accused. 8
1. State Interest
The preclusion sanction is a means by which the state seeks to
enforce prosecutorial pretrial discovery. However, such discovery is
not sought by the state as an end in itself, but merely as a procedurc
for furthering two underlying state interests: preventing surprise at
tria 70 and reducing the trial load in overburdened courts.8 0 These
interests are "compelling" with regard to the preclusion sanction only
if two criteria are met: The interests must be important in and of
themselves, and pretrial discovery must be the only method of ade-
quately effectuating those interests. If either criterion is not satisfied,
the state has not shown a compelling reason for precluding evidence
which may be vital to the presentation of the defendant's case.
Although degrees of importance or "compellingness" are difficult
to characterize and fit into neat categories, the basic interests served
by prosecutorial pretrial discovery seem sufficiently important to
demand judicial deference. First, the Court has endorsed the principle
that the search for truth in the criminal process is enhanced if the
prosecutor is informed of at least the basic outline of the defendant's
case before the trial begins.81 This conclusion follows from the belief
that the adversary process works best when each party is fully prepared
to counter the arguments of the other. Second, the overcrowded
dockets and serious delays which characterize the judicial system in
many American jurisdictions today testify to the importance of the
state interest in reducing the case load in its courts.8 2
77. Note, supra note 75, at 467-68.
78. In applying this balancing procedure, a court, though considering the alternatives
suggested later in this Note (pp. 1356-60 infra) need not perform the legislative role of
selecting a particular alternative to be implemented through the passae of new pretrial
discovery statutes. All that a court must do is determine whether, given the available
alternatives, there exists a procedure which will be sufficiently effective to satisfy the
asserted state interest. See Note, Blacklisting Through the Oficial Publication of Coil.
gressional Reports, 81 YALE L.J. 188, 224-25 (1971).
79. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970); State ex rcl. Simos v. Burke, 11 WIs.2d
129, 133, 163 N.W.2d 177, 182 (1968); Waddington, Criminal Discovery and the Alibi
Defense, 37 L.A.B. BULL. 7, 8 (1953).
80. In this regard, it has been suggested that prosecutorial pretrial discovery will
facilitate reduction of trial backlog by eliminating the need for trial completely In
many cases. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 105-06 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
81. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970).
82. Burger, C.J., The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970).
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These interests, however, are only compelling with regard to the
preclusion sanction if the pretrial discovery procedure which preclu-
sion effectuates is actually necessary for the service of those interests.
If alternative means of avoiding surprise and reducing court conges-
tion are available, and those means do not entail the infringement
of constitutional rights which results from application of the discov-
ery/preclusion procedure, the state cannot show the requisite need
for that procedure.8 3 Similarly, if pretrial discovery does not itself
make a significant contribution to the realization of these two state
interests, sufficient need for the discovery/preclusion procedure can-
not be demonstrated.
The Court in Williams, having found no infringement of petition-
er's Fifth Amendment rights through the use of the notice of alibi
procedure,84 never reached this matter of alternatives to prosecutorial
discovery. But a recent Note8s criticizing the Williams holding 0 did
discuss that question. In considering the state's interest in avoiding
surprise at trial, the Note concluded that this goal could reasonably
be achieved by a "more effective use of the state's enormous investi-
gatory ability . . .,, and by granting continuances in those cases in
which the prosecutor is actually surprised.s8 Because the state's interest
in avoiding surprise may be satisfied by means other than prosecutorial
discovery, the use of that procedure, although legitimate, lacks the
urgency necessary to justify infringement of a defendant's constitu-
tional rights.8 9
Similarly, while the state's general desire to reduce the trial load
in its court system may be compelling under certain circumstances,
there is no indication that pretrial discovery by the prosecution will
significantly contribute to that reduction. The first argument in
favor of pretrial discovery is that this procedure will lead to more
frequent dismissals. This contention seems rather specious, however,
considering that a defendant aware of persuasive exculpatory evidence
will probably volunteer that information to the prosecutor.10 Manda-
tory pretrial disclosure therefore is unlikely to do more than mini-
83. Since the preclusion sanction was not at issue in Villiams, 399 US. 78, 83 n.14
(1970), and no other aspect of the Florida notice of alibi statute uas found to infringe
upon the petitioner's constitutional rights, this showing of necessity was not required
by -the Court.
84. 399 U.S. at 86.
85. Note, supra note 2.
86. Id. at 1006-08.
87. Id. at 1010.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1011.
90. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
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mally increase the dismissal rate. On the other hand, requiring pre-
trial disclosure by the defendant may very well improve the efficiency
of the plea bargaining procedure and, in that way, effectuate the
state's interest in reducing the trial load. For example, by laying
bare the weaknesses of potential defenses, pretrial disclosure will limit
the defendant's ability to bluff, thereby increasing the pressure to
plead guilty.
Yet, how significant is this greater informational flow to the insti-
tution of plea bargaining? First, the prosecutor already has superior
investigative resources at his disposal through which to discover in-
criminating evidence. Second, and more importantly, the prosecutor
has the flexibility to offer a wide range of deals to induce the de-
fendant to plead guilty. While a defendant's increased ability to bluff
in the absence of disclosure may bring about a lower sentence in the
bargain, there is little probability that the defendant will risk trial
and force that bluff to be called. Therefore, pretrial discovery would
seem to add little to the effectiveness of plea bargaining in reducing
the trial load.91
In summary, although the underlying state interests in avoiding
surprise at trial and in reducing the trial load may be substantial, the
use of pretrial discovery would appear unnecessary to achieving the
former goal and of only marginal effectiveness in achieving the latter.
Nevertheless, the term "compelling" is difficult to define, and a court
might well find, contrary to the conclusion of this Note, that the
state does have a compelling interest in utilizing the pretrial discovery
procedure. However, even assuming arguendo that this might be
established, the existence of methods of enforcing pretrial discovery
less restrictive of individual rights than the preclusion sanction would
make the use of that sanction unconstitutional.
2. Alternative Sanctions
Application of this "less drastic means" formula to the preclusion
sanction requires an analysis of the effectiveness of the various al-
ternatives, applied either individually or in concert in serving the
state's interest in pretrial discovery, in view of the multitude of situ-
ations which might arise. In evaluating the net effectiveness of a par-
ticular sanction, recognition must be given to two factors: potential to
91. Of course, were plea bargaining itself to be found unconstitutional, as a recent
Note has suggested (see Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HaRV.
L. Rav. 1387, 1407 (1970)), then pretrial discovery, of benefit only in its support of plea
bargaining, would be useless as a means of reducing the trial load.
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deter noncompliance with pretrial discovery statutes and cost of appli-
cation to the state in terms of money and other resources. The degree of
effectiveness of a proposed sanction will vary directly with the former
and inversely with the latter. Furthermore, an appropriate method of
measuring deterrent potential would be through the development of
a cost-benefit analysis,92 from the point of view of the defendant.
For example, where the perceived benefits of nondisclosure are low,
even a rather light sanction may be sufficiently costly to deter violation.
The key to effective utilization of the range of sanctions open to
the state is flexibility in applying them. The various sanctions differ
in their severity, their focus and their effect on the trial process. In
addition, the point in the process at which the defendant's failure to
comply is ascertained may effect the utility of these alternatives. The
following discussion will attempt to assimilate these considerations
into an assessment of the probable effectiveness of the panoply of
alternatives available to the state, as well as the impact of these alter-
natives on the rights of the accused.
a. Continuance. Although there have been suggestions that a con-
tinuance is really no sanction at all,03 it should still be used by tie
court as a remedial measure where, as permitted by many existing
pretrial discovery statutes, the defendant can offer good cause for his
failure to comply.94 As for deterrent value, a continuance has little
direct cost to the defendant, 95 but it should substantially reduce the
primary benefit of intentional noncompliance-surprise.00 On the
other hand, continuances are costly to the state in terms of adminis-
trative efficiency and are of limited feasibility in a jury trial.
07
92. This term is used throughout this Note to depict a model for the thought process
or reaction of a particular class of persons faced with a choice situation. It should not
be confused with the more technical, empirically rigorous definition which the term
has received in economic planning literature.
93. Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J. Cpi.t. L.C. &- P.S. 29, 35.-36 (1961).
94. In fact, only in Kansas must the court order preclusion with no exception for
good cause shown. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3218 (Supp. 1971); Epstein, supra note 90,
at 35.
95. Nevertheless, to the innocent defendant who has either been denied bail or
cannot afford it, the additional confinement period resulting from the continuance
would be rather costly. As for those defendants who are in fact guilty, it has been
argued that, far from being costly, delays can only work to their advantage. While it
is true that delay may lead to memory lapse or disappearance of witnesses, these meentu-
alities are not likely to arise from the one limited continuance which may be granted
to overcome surprise. This result can be contrasted with the more realistic po1ibility
of such benefits flowing from long, repeated delays-such as may be required by con-
tinual courtroom disruptions or, perhaps, by the failure of the accused to appear at
trial altogether.
96. Brief for Virgil Jenkins, Amicus Curiae at 23-24, Williams v. Florida, 399 US.
78 (1970); Note, supra note 2, at 1010. Note also that in Oklahoma the only sanction
available to the court is a continuance. See note 14 supra.
97. Rezneck, New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1276, 1293 (1966.
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b. Limiting Pretrial Discovery by the Defendant. A more drastic
sanction than the continuance is the prohibiting of further discovery
by the defendant. 98 Given the minimal investigative resources often
available to the defendant, this procedure may very well exert sufficient
pressure to promote compliance. However, the court may be unaware
of defendant's noncompliance until trial, thereby eliminating the
applicability of this sanction completely. Furthermore, restriction of
defense discovery would not only undermine the search for truth,
which is thought to be enhanced by liberal discovery,00 but would
also harbor constitutional defects like those of preclusion to the extent
that the defendant has a constitutional right to pretrial discovery. 100
Nevertheless, discovery foreclosure does not directly prevent the intro-
duction of material evidence at trial and it must be viewed therefore
as a sanction less drastic than outright preclusion.
c. Comment on Defendant's Failure to Comply. The opportunity for
the prosecutor or the court to comment upon the credibility of evi-
dence offered by the defendant, in view of his noncompliance, would
seem to be a forceful deterrent to the defendant's wilful disobedi-
ence.' 0 ' While similar to the continuance in its negation of some of
the benefits of surprise, comment adds a cost factor to the defendant
lacking in the continuance remedy as a result of its influential impact
upon the jury. Yet, despite this deterrent potential and the absence
of application costs to the state, there is a possibility that this sanction
is also constitutionally defective.
At the outset, since the defendant has no right of noncompliance,
comment would not represent an impermissible burden on the exer-
cise of a constitutional right. 02 A more difficult question, however, is
raised by the due process ramifications of comment. In order to sat-
isfy the requirements of due process, a comment on the credibility
of evidence must be based on the existence of some rational connection
between a characteristic of the evidence and the likely truth or
falsity of that evidence. 10 3 Whereas the rational connection between
98. This sanction was recommended in Note, Criminal Law: Constittuionality of
Conditional Mutual Discovery Under Federal Rule 16, 19 OKIA. L. REv. 419, 424 (1966).
99. See note 79 supra.
100. Rezneck, supra note 94, at 1289-90. Cf. Brady v. Miaryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
101. The detrimental impact of comment on the defendant was recognized by the
Court in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). In that case, comment on the
defendant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incriminatlon was
held to be sufficiently costly to the defendant so as to represent an impermissible btrden
on the exercise of a constitutional right.
102. See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
103. Cf. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
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intentional nondisclosure and evidentiary untrustworthiness lacks the
degree of certainty necessary to justify the irrebuttable presumption
supporting preclusion,104 it probably has sufficient inferential value
to permit a comment on credibilityloa Consequently, this sanction
will not be effective at the expense of defendant's constitutional rights.
d. Criminal Sanctions for Failure to Comply. The fourth alternative
available to the state is the promulgation of a statute which would
make the wilful refusal to comply with a pretrial discovery order a
criminal act. Such a statute would be similar to those already enacted
to penalize the defendant's wilful failure to appear at trial.100 Further-
more, although this sanction is parallel in effect to a contempt cita-
tion, it affords the defendant all of the procedural safeguards absent
in that abbreviated proceeding.0 Nevertheless, there are two factors
which may reduce the net effectiveness of this sanction. First, for
those defendants facing long prison terms, the incremental burden
of a small additional sentence will not be a great deterrent. Second,
limitations on judicial resources make the necessity of another trial
burdensome to the state.
e. Contempt Against Counsel. Whereas the foregoing alternatives
rely for deterrence on penalizing the defendant to gain compliance,
this last sanction focuses on counsel.los In contrast to the fourth al-
ternative, the effectiveness of imposing a short prison term on counsel
will not be diluted through comparison with the possibility of incur-
ring a more severe sentence. Moreover, while the defendant benefits
directly from noncompliance, counsel does so only in his representa-
tive capacity. In short, applying a cost-benefit analysis from counsel's
point of view would lead to the conclusion that this sanction possesses
great deterrent potential.10 9
On the other hand, the applicability of this alternative depends on
104. See pp. 1349-51 supra.
105. Comment has been recognized as valid under shnilar inferences of unreliability,
although preclusion had been found impermissible. See United States v. Nolte, 440 F.2d
1124, 1126 (5th Cir. 1971); Braswell v. Wainwright, 330 F. Supp. 281, 28-1, note 3
(S.D. Fla. 1971).
106. See, e.g., CONN. G.,. STAT. Rtv. § 53-154 (1968).
107. For criticism of the contempt sanction see The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84
HARV. L. REv. 31, 99-100 (1970). Despite its drawbacks, however, the availability of the
contempt sanction should not be overlooked in the event that the legislature fails to
provide the other alternatives discussed in the te.'XL
108. It is doubtful that counsel, consistent with his representative function, would in
fact be free to comply with a pretrial discovery order over the objection of the de-
fendant. Probably the most that counsel can do, if his client refuses disclosure, is to
withdraw from the case.
109. Rezneck, supra note 94, at 1294.
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counsel's awareness of the existence of evidence for which the prose-
cutor has requested discovery. As a result, a defendant might seek to
frustrate the use of this sanction by withholding information from
counsel. Such a communications breakdown may well undermine the
effective assistance of counsel. Thus, this sanction might abridge con-
stitutional rights effectively by denying the defendant his right to
counsel,"10 as well as undermining an essential prerequisite of the
adversary system: that each advocate have as much knowledge as pos-
sible about the facts of his client's case."'1 However, the seriousness
of this problem should be diminished by the defendant's interest in
full communication, in permitting counsel to develop a more com-
plete case.
3. Preclusion in the Balance
Following this examination of the alternatives available to the state,
the balancing test embodied in the less drastic means analysis may
now be employed. The relevant question becomes: does the state's
interest in the added effectiveness of the preclusion sanction as a
means of enforcing pretrial discovery outweigh the limitation placed
by that sanction upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
present a defense?"12
First, in order to determine the probable effectiveness of the alter-
natives suggested above there must be an assessment of both their
deterrent potential and their cost of application when used in what-
ever combination will best serve the interests of the state. As to de-
terrent potential, contempt against counsel should prove effective in
those cases in which counsel is aware of the relevant information.
Moreover, the number of cases of defendant's nondisclosure to counsel
should be minimal. This conclusion is supported by a rough cost-
benefit analysis: the costs to the defendant from his secrecy (an ad-
ditional criminal penalty and the handicapping of his counsel) being
in most cases greater than the benefits that can be derived from his
failure to disclose (since the combination of continuance and com-
ment substantially reduces the advantage of surprise). Implementa-
110. Note, supra note 2, at 1003 n.35.
111. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mie. L. REv. 1469, 1469-74 (1966).
112. It is important to bear in mind, in assessing this balance, that it is not the
state's interest versus the interest of the individual defendant which is at stake. On the
contrary, it is the interest of all defendants in asserting their right to present a defense
which must be offset against the state's interest. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733, 776-77 (1964).
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tion of these alternatives would entail certain costs of application,
primarily because of the increased resources required by continuances
and additional trials. These costs, however, would not seem to justify
the infringement of Sixth Amendment rights which results from the
use of the preclusion sanction.
While several of the alternatives suggested above involve the pos-
sibility of various constitutional objections, none entails the danger
raised by the preclusion sanction that the outcome of a trial might
be changed. The preclusion sanction alone threatens to permit the
conviction of an individual who is innocent of the crime for which
he is charged because of his commission of a separate wrong-the fail-
ure to comply with pretrial discovery. To risk conviction on such
erroneous grounds seems directly to conflict with "a fundamental
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."1
13
Finally, when balancing a loss of effectiveness in the administration
of the criminal process against the cost of convicting an innocent de-
fendant, consideration should be given to the suggestion that the
Constitution itself, by commanding that the defendant be permitted
to present his defense, may reflect a deliberate resolution of this bal-
ance." 4 With this in mind, and in view of the questionable urgency
of the state's interest in pretrial discovery, nla the advantage to the
state afforded by preclusion must be more than marginal to justify
such constitutional infringement under the compelling state interest
test."x6
113. In re -Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
114. cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1970) (Black, J., dissnting). See
also Note, supra note 2, at 1009 n.60, in which the author's discussion of this possibility
with regard to the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the Sixth Amendment right to
present a defense as well.
115. See pp. 1355-56 supra.
116. A comparison with two analogous instances in which courts have faced the
incompatibility of the state's interest, on the one hand, and a defendant's constitutional
rights, on the other, may prove helpful at this poinL The first area is the domain of
government privilege, in which the state's interest in secrecy, in order to protect either
state secrets or informants, may conflict with the defendant's right to present a defense.
Where the government has sought to invoke either of these privileges, most courts have
held that the government must choose between dismissal of the charges or loss of the
privilege. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957) (infornmant privilege),
and United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Andolschck,
142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) (state secret privilege). Although no meaningful com-
parison can be drawn between the degree of urgency of the state's interest in secrecy
versus its interest in pretrial discovery, it should be noted that dismissal is a far more
costly alternative to the state than the alternatives to preclusion suggested at pp. 1356-
60 supra.
A second area of conflict between interests of the state and the rights of the de.
fendant arises when a defendant persists in disrupting the trial proceedings. To eject
the defendant from the courtroom would infringe his right to confront the witnesses
against him, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, but to permit him to remain
might impair the state's interest in a trial free of disorderly interruption and spectacle.
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B. Conditional Privilege Test
A second theory by which courts have justified the preclusion sanc-
tion derives from a conditional privilege argument. Under this theory,
where the discovery statute provides for the conditioning of defense
disclosure on prior disclosure by the prosecution, 117
the restrictions imposed ... do not come into operation until and
unless the defense activates them. Thus, assuming arguendo that
the exclusion infringes on an absolute right, the infringement,
if any, is brought about solely by the action of the defense."18
In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Court chose to resolve this conflict in favor
of the state's interest where the defendant "insists on conducting himself in a manner
so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried
on with him in the courtroom." Id. at 343. Although this decision seems to be based oil
the theory that the defendant's actions amounted to a "waiver through misconduct" of
the right to remain in the courtroom and confront witnesses, this position has been
effectively criticized in Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel,
Forward to The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1970). In fact, the
Allen Court probably should have employed a balancing test, similar to the one described
in the text. See The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, supra note 107, at 96.
Although it is again difficult to compare state interests, a comparison of the respective
alternatives reveals that those designed to enforce pretrial discovery are more likely to
be effective than those thus far developed to prevent uncontrollable outbursts at trial.
The Court in Allen mentions two possible alternatives to removing the defendant front
the courtroom: physical restraint and summary contempt. See Helwig, Coping with the
Unruly Criminal Defendant: The Options of the Allen Case, 7 CONZAGA L. REV. 17, 17.18
(1971). As to the former, its costs of application are so great as to render it a virtually
useless alternative. 597 U.S. at 350 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). As for sumnntary
contempt, this sanction might be applied in two different ways. First, a court might
use a civil contempt procedure in which the defendant would be imprisoned until lie
agreed to refrain from further outbursts. The Court, however, noted a basic defect lit
this alternative in that the defendant may seek to profit from the resulting unavailability
of adverse witnesses due to this prolonged, self-defined delay. Id. at 345. As for criminal
contempt, in which the defendant is sentenced to a prison term after the trial Is toll-
cluded, resort to a cost-benefit analysis from the defendant's standpoint indicates that
the cost of additional confinement will not be nearly so great a deterrent in the Allen
situation as it should be in enforcing pretrial discovery. Specifically, the benefits of
permanent disruption, alluded to above, will be greater than those of surprise, Cs'
pecially where the benefits of the latter are reduced by continuance and comntet. lit
addition, irrespective of these strategical differences, whereas courtroom disruptions may
have propaganda value in a political trial, it is doubtfutl that a similar benefit would
attach to the failure to comply with pretrial discovery. Therefore, although the benefits
of permanent disruption will more likely outweigh the cost of additional confilnenent,
this should not be so in the pretrial discovery situation.
Finally, the infringement of constitutional rights inherent in removal does not appear
to be as significant as that resulting from the preclusion of material evidence. Because
a defendant can both view the trial and communicate with his attorney after lie Is
removed from the courtroom, the deleterious effect of removal on the search for truth
should be less than that wrought by preclusion. In sum, while the state interests iII
this comparison might arguably be equal, the alternatives available to enforce pretrial
discovery are more effective, and the cost of preclusion, in terms of harn to tile tie.
fendant, is greater than for the removal sanction. Consequently, although loss of the
right of confrontation may be practically unavoidable in controlling cotrtroom disrup.
tions, the same degree of necessity does not arise to justify the use of preclusion to en.
force pretrial discovery.
117. See, e.g., FLA. R. CriN. P. § 1.220(c), (e) (1967); Proposed Rule 16, at 594-95,
118. Cacciatore v. State, 226 So.2d 137, 140 (Fla. App. 1969).
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The Preclusion Sanction
Thus, an attempt is made to justify preclusion on the grounds that
the defendant has chosen to waive his Sixth Amendment right to
present a defense as a condition of accepting the benefit of pretrial
discovery. The theory, however, clearly violates the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions. 119 Pursuant to this theory, the conditional
waiver of a constitutional right is impermissible where such condition
bears no reasonable relationship to the benefit offered -20 The state
may contend that such a relationship between benefit and condition
exists, and that affording the defendant pretrial discovery requires
similar discovery by the prosecution. This assertion has been ques-
tioned.12 1 Even were it valid, however, it would only justify the con-
ditional waiver 22 of the right to present a defense if that were the
only means by which the state could be assured of reciprocal discov-
ery. 12 3 In short, the less drastic means analysis employed in the pre-
ceding section is equally applicable here.12 4 If it is found that the
alternative sanctions heretofore examined are sufficiently likely to
protect the state's interest in pretrial discovery, the fact that discovery
is reciprocal will not save the preclusion sanction from being un-
constitutional.
119. See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, Supplemental Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 276-78 (1956)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from Rule 16), in which Justice Douglas argues that reciprocal
discovery might unconstitutionally condition the loss of the defendant's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. While this view was answered by the Court's
holding in Williams that there was no loss of the privilege in the first place, Douglas'
reasoning remains applicable to the conditional waiver of the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to present a defense, as discussed in the text, pp. 1362.63 supra. For a good
discussion of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions see Note, Another Look at Un-
constitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
120. Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1590 (1960).
121. Note, supra note 2, at 1011 n.64.
122. Although in this instance waiver is part of a conditional benefit pattern, the
waiver concept might also be employed where discovery is not reciprocal. In such a
case, waiver might be couched in the following terms: as long as the defendant is aware
that his failure to supply information demanded by the prosecution will lead to the
possible loss of his right to present a defense, his choice not to comply amounts to a
knowing waiver of that right. The difficulty with this approach is that it misconstrues
the purpose of the waiver option. Defendants are permitted to waive constitutional
rights where those rights and certain perceived benefits are inherently mutually exclu-
sive. For example, it is obvious that an accused cannot simultaneously represent himself
and have the right to counsel. On the other hand, in the case of preclusion, the per-
ceived benefit of nondisclosure and the right to present a defense are not naturally anti-
thetical. Without this state-imposed sanction, the defendant who chose not to disclose
could still present his defense at trial. Consequently, the waiver in this case is the
product of a choice situation manufactured by the state to effectuate the state interest
in pretrial disclosure. As such, the relevant inquiry is the same as under the compelling
state interest test, again involving the application of the doctrine of the reasonable al-
ternative.
123. Note, supra note 119, at 156-57.
124. Id.
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III. Conclusion
In Washington v. Texas, 25 the Supreme Court established that the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment afforded the
defendant a right to present all relevant and material testimony in his
defense. In so holding, the Court was simply recognizing a policy,
long advocated by courts1 26 and commentators -7 alike, that elimina-
tion of the antiquated doctrine of presumptive untrustworthiness
would strengthen the adversary process. Yet, the sanction of preclusion,
based on this discredited doctrine, has been embodied in numerous
state and federal pretrial discovery statutes. The result is evident: an
infringement of the defendant's constitutional rights.
On balance, the justifications for this infringement are unpersua-
sive. The prosecutorial pretrial discovery procedure may arguably be
the only means of promoting certain compelling state interests, and
constitutional infringement might be permissible if preclusion were
the only effective sanction for enforcing this discovery procedure. But
other procedures less drastic than prosecutorial pretrial discovery may
be used to achieve the asserted state interests. Furthermore, even if
pretrial disclosure by the defendant is necessary, a range of alternative
sanctions is available which, if implemented properly, should ade.
quately enforce disclosure while restricting the rights of the accused
less drastically. The right to present a defense is a fundamental ele-
ment of due process. 128 In the absence of necessity, that right may
not be overborne by legislative fiat or judicial discretion.
125. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
126. See note 46 supra.
127. See note 53 supra.
128. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
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